Sonderkommando Lange

Proposal for the Award of the War Merit Cross II Class with Swords by the Gestapo Headquarters in Posen, dated June 16, 1943. This document lists four members of Sonderkommando Kulmhof operating Chełmno extermination camp – Herbert Hiecke-Richter, Walter Burmeister, and gas van drivers Oskar Hering and Gustav Laabs – who were involved in the “direct combat and extermination of state enemies.” Their actions are described as requiring “a particularly manly and strong mental attitude” in service of “solving one of the most critical racial issues”.

In this intercepted radio communication dated 4 October 1941, Heinrich Himmler replied to Wilhelm Koppe that “the Sonderkommando is to be dispatched immediately”. This communcation refers to Koppe’s earlier messsage whether Sonderkommando Lange could be provided to clear an asylum in Veliky Novgorod as requested by the German army.

In this radio communication dated 3 October 1941, intercepted by British intelligence, the Higher SS and Police Leader Posen, Wilhelm Koppe, asked for Himmler’s decision to “dispatch Sonderkommando Lange with appropriate aparatus to clear three asylums near Novgorod” in occupied Northwest Russia. This request followed an initiative by Hans Hefelmann from the Chancellery of the Führer. The Army High Command offered to provide logistical support by sending “a Ju 52 to Posen on the morning of October 5th so that Krimiminal-Kommissar Lange with approximately 5 employees can promptly begin his work”.

On 16 August, 1941, the British intelligence intercepted a radio message from the Higher SS and Police Leader Center, Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski, to the Higher SS and Police Leader Posen, Wilhelm Koppe. In this communication, von dem Bach-Zelewski requested Koppe to “order the immediate deployment of Hauptsturmführer Lange, etc., to Baranowicze. On August 15, 1941, the day before, Himmler attended a demonstration shooting in Minsk and visited the Novinki asylum near Minsk. According to von dem Bach-Zelewski, Himmler ordered the facility to be cleared using a more humane method than shooting.

Two days after Bach-Zelewski requested Sonderkommando Lange to come to Baranowicze, on August 18, 1941, the British intelligence intercepted another radio message from the Higher SS and Police Leader Center, Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski, to the Higher SS and Police Leader Posen, Wilhelm Koppe. Von dem Bach-Zelewksi acknowledged that Sonderkommando is not available at the moment, but stressed again “that Lange be made temporarily available to me upon becoming available” as he would like “to have the procedure demonstrated to me personally” by him.

On October 22, 1940, the Higher SS and Police Leader of East Prussia, SS-Gruppenführer Wilhelm Rediess, forwarded a letter from Wendelin Seith of Sonderkommando Lange to the Chief of the Personal Staff Reichsführer SS, SS-Gruppenführer Karl Wolff, with a request to address Seith’s complaint. Rediess also mentioned that “the commando will be deployed in Holland according to the men’s wishes” and that “the Reichsführer-SS places great importance on the care of the men entrusted with this difficult task”. It can be presumed that the members of Sonderkommando Lange were sent to Holland for a recreational mission (collective vacation).

As Wilhelm Rediess declined to pay 10 Reichsmarks for each institutional inmate killed by the Sonderkommando Lange in Soldau and requested a decision from the Reichsführer-SS, Wilhelm Koppe reiterates his position on this matter to Karl Wolff, chief of the personal staff of the Reichsführer-SS. Koppe notes that he “took 1,558 troublesome people away from the Higher SS and Police Leader Northeast for alternative accommodation” and emphasises “it was necessary for a Kommando from my office to stay in East Prussia for 17 days”. He stresses that East-Prussia’s “Gauleiter Koch has agreed to cover all expenses associated with this order”. Additionally, the payment will be also used to fund “Sonderkommando Lange’s stay in Holland ordered by the Reichsführer-SS with over RM 3,000”.

This document, dated November 7, 1940, is a response to the letter from Wilhelm Koppe to Jakob Sporrenberg. The former Higher SS and Police Leader of East-Prussia, Wilhelm Rediess, escalated the financial dispute to the Reichsführer-SS over the payment of 10 RM for each victim killed by Sonderkommando Lange in Soldau (East-Prussia). In the letter, addressed to Karl Wolff of Himmler’s personal staff, Rediess mentions “the Kommando Lange” evacuated “1,558 inmates from the East Prussian Provincial Institutions” and “also about 250 to 300 mentally ill (Poles) from the Zichenau region” after “obtaining permission from the Reichsführer-SS”. He explains that he could not take Koppe’s demand for “payment of RM 10.- for each patient…seriously”, as he considered “the matter to be in the interest of the Reich”. Wolff added a handwritten remark “Brack” to the text, referencing to Viktor Brack, a key figure in implementing Nazi Euthanasia.

In the letter of 19 October, 1940, the Higher SS and Police Leader of the Warthegau, Wilhelm Koppe, disclosed to his counterpart in East Prussia, Jakob Sporrenberg, that “the so-called Sonderkommando Lange…evacuated 1,558 sick individuals from the transit camp in Soldau” in the period from May 21 to June 8, 1940. Koppe mentions that Sporrenberg’s predecessor, Wilhelm Rediess, had agreed “at that time that an amount of RM 10.- should be paid for the evacuation of each sick person”. At the beginning of the operation, the “leader of Sonderkommando Lange, Kriminalkommissar Lange, took an advance of RM 2,000.- from the Inspector of the Security Police and the SD in Königsberg”. Koppe requests from Sporrenberg the “transfer the remaining amount of RM 13,580”. The document provides insight into the administrative and logistical aspects of early Nazi extermination operations, particularly how they managed and funded the tasks involved SS and police units.

At the end of 1941, the SS-Sonderkommando leader Herbert Lange recruited Plate to the extermination camp Kulmhof. After the departure of SS-Obersturmführer Herbert Otto in early 1942, Plate assumed the position of acting camp commander until the camp’s dissolution. In this role, Plate was a key figure in the extermination of Jews at Kulmhof. He personally shot members of the Jewish work commando selected for execution.

The letter, dated September 18, 1940, is addressed from SS-Oberscharführer Wendelin Seith to the Higher SS and Police Leader of East-Prussia SS-Gruppenführer Wilhelm Redieß. Seith, serving as a driver for Sonderkommando Lange, expresses gratitude for receiving an amber box as gift for their mission in Soldau, noting the challenges faced and the lack of recognition except through this gift. Redieß forwarded the letter to Karl Wolff, chief of the Personal Staff Reichsführer SS Heinrich Himmler. This document stands as one of the earliest explicit references to Sonderkommando Lange within contemporary German records.

The document describes the fate of 127 individuals identified as “Jews with children under 14 years,” deported from Kalisch by the Sonderkommando Lange on December 1, 1941. Notably, the memo recounts the escape of Mojsie Nejmanowicz, Sara Nejmanowicz, and Nechemja Nejmanowicz from the camp. Additionally, it mentions that the possessions of the deportees will be collected by the “Gestapo.” See also the report by the same author regarding a prior deportation supported by local police in Kalisch.

This document of November 22, 1941 was written by Hauptmann Speckmann from the regular police in Kalisch (Kalisz) and describes procedures for the deportation of Jews by Sonderkommando Lange. The killer commando is referred to as “official of the Special Representative of the Secret State Police.” The handwritten memo provides detailed instructions regarding guard duty. Furthermore, it discusses the consolidation of areas and the apprehension of escaped Jews. The document concludes with the temporary stop of the so-called “Jewish action” as ordered by Sonderkommando Lange, withdrawal of guard duty and the transfer of workshop keys to an official of the Economic Office. Thus, the document provides some valuable insights into the logistics of the deportation of the Jews during the phase when Sonderkommando Lange operated as a mobile killing unit.

On September 2, 1941, Rolf-Heinz Höppner, head of the Central Migration Office in Posen, outlined plans for reorganizing the office to address the impending task of “resettling millions of people”. Höppner stressed that it is “essential…to have complete clarity from the outset about the ultimate fate of these displaced ethnic groups unwanted in the Greater German Settlement Areas—whether the goal is to secure a certain life for them permanently or to eradicate them entirely.”

On January 6, 1942, Herman Krumey, the head of the Migration Central Office in Litzmannstadt, recorded the names of three SS men provided by the Migration Central Office to Sonderkommando Lange: SS-Obersturmführer Herbert Otto, SS-Hauptscharführer Fritz Ismer, and SS-Scharführer Karl Goede. The group was accompanied by the driver Grebe, whose first name remains unknown.

On December 18, 1941, Ernst Damzog, the Inspector of the Security Police and SD in Posen, wrote to Hermann Krumey, the head of the Migration Central Office Litzmannstadt, that he has “informed SS-Hauptsturmführer Krim.-Kommissar Lange about the delegation of the 3 SS leaders or sub-leaders to his commando”. The notorious obligation declaration, binding all members of the Sonderkommando to strict secrecy, was scheduled to be administered personally by Lange.

On July 16, 1941, authorities in the Reichsgau Wartheland convened to deliberate on what was euphemistically termed the “solution of the Jewish question.” Rolf-Heinz Höppner, head of the SD and Umwandererzentralstelle (Migration Center Office) in Posen, forwarded the discussed proposals to Adolf Eichmann, seeking his feedback. Höppner himself regarded the suggestions as “fantastic,” yet entirely viable.

The following report, dated February 1945, was authored by Heinrich May, detailing his experience and knowledge of the Kulmhof (Chelmno) extermination camp in the Warthegau. The document integrates May’s firsthand observations on-site, explanations provided by members of Sonderkommando Kulmhof, and descriptions relayed by other visitors of Sonderkommando Kulmhof.

In March 1942, Bothmann assumed the role of commander at the Kulmhof extermination camp, succeeding Herbert Lange in this position.

Heinrich May served as the head of the forestry office in Warthbrücken (now Koło) within the Warthegau region, which included overseeing operations at the Kulmhof Forestry. Between 1941 and 1944, May bore witness to the atrocities committed at the Kulmhof extermination camp.

Lange oversaw the infamous Sonderkommando Lange and subsequently assumed command at the Kulmhof extermination camp. In this capacity, he bore the responsibility for orchestrating the systematic slaughter of both inmates of asylums and Jews within the Warthegau region.

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