III B 2 d – Dr. Str./So.
Berlin, October 18, 1944
Subject: Reorganization of Polish Policy
Since 1939, the policy on Poland has been based on the following four assumptions:
1. The thousand-year struggle between the German and Polish peoples, Polish war guilt, and the murder of tens of thousands of ethnic Germans in September 1939.
2. The biological inferiority of most of the Polish people and the danger that mixing presents to the German national body.
3. The fact that large parts of the territory inhabited by Poland in 1939 were re-incorporated into the Reich (the incorporated eastern territories), while the rest was considered future German settlement and national soil (the General Government, or GG).
4. An imminent end to the war.
As a result, the Polish policy in the present foresaw an impending final solution, with the long-term goal of displacing the Polish population from areas of interest to the Reich towards the East. This policy was intended to concentrate the Polish people in the area of the GG (evacuations from the incorporated eastern territories), politically neutralize them, and, where Poles lived or had to live among Germans, treat them differently to minimize all political and biological threats to the German people. A final and official decision on the ultimate fate of the Polish people was not reached. While the GG was occasionally referred to as the “home of the Polish people,” the German leadership endeavored not to give the Poles a sense of homeland, leaving them unclear about German intentions and their post-war fate. The relocation (instead of extermination) of the Polish intelligentsia from the incorporated eastern territories to the GG led to a concentration of politically active Poles, which became all the more dangerous since there were no safety valves left for political activity, nor could any be concealed.
Until 1942, there was a willingness to cooperate, particularly among farmers and workers, though even then economic conditions (inadequate control and, consequently, black markets) were unsatisfactory and did not reflect well on the abilities of the German administration. Encouraged by enemy propaganda and caused mainly by the Reich’s military setbacks and the inconsistent Polish policies in the GG, which continually gave the Poles the impression of German weakness, the internal political situation in the GG deteriorated significantly, leading to an increase in activity and power of the WB (resistance movement), effectively making it a “state within a state.” The insufficient German countermeasures due to a lack of personnel, frequent policy shifts regarding Poland, and signs of decay within the German sector of the GG (Warsaw, next to Paris, was a significant hub for black-market trading) greatly strengthened the WB. Incorrect political measures (e.g., forced relocations in Zamość, labor raids) intensified Polish resistance. Careless German promises that were not fulfilled (such as food provisions) provided welcome propaganda slogans for the WB and foreign countries. Generally, a consistent line in the GG’s propaganda policy was lacking. Additionally, the strong Polish desire for freedom and its conspiratorial nature played a role, as did the stigmatizing “P” designation for Poles in the Reich, along with restrictions on Polish cultural life, especially in education and limited involvement in administration.
The Polish people feel, partly due to all these measures by the German side and especially the lack of German statements about their future fate in the new Europe, cast out from the European community of nations and fear that they, similar to the Jewish people, are to be annihilated in their ethnic substance.
The almost thousand-year-old Polish yearning for a Greater Poland is more alive than ever. The Polish people are willing to make any sacrifice for it. Therefore, treating this people with methods England used for non-European peoples (tin spoons and cotton) is from the outset not applicable to the Polish people. There are three fundamental possibilities for solving the Polish problem:
1. A harsh but fair treatment with the full restoration of lost German authority in all areas of life, using all means of power in the GG. This would meet all biological and ethno-political demands from the National Socialist standpoint.
2. One could fundamentally abandon viewing Polish policy solely in terms of the long-term goal, without completely abandoning it, and, as before, avoid making definitive statements about future German settlement in the GG. Two approaches would be possible in this case:
a) The treatment of the Polish population is somewhat relaxed, with a potential solution of the Polish question as a German protectorate, if the Polish people prove their worth.
b) The Polish population is immediately given significant participation in the GG administration, potentially receiving limited autonomy, similar to the Protectorate or Slovakia, with self-administration.
3. Abandon the previous conception that the GG, the territory historically inhabited by Poles, would become German settlement soil, and implement a solution similar to 2b) already at present.
However, the prerequisite is a high-level decision on the future fate of the GG, whether it will remain German settlement land or not, and whether or not Polish cooperation is desirable.
The solution of the Polish problem in the incorporated eastern territories is much clearer and, from this perspective, independent of the GG’s structure, as the previous view that the incorporated eastern territories will be settled by Germans cannot be abandoned. Relaxing Polish policy in these areas is practically impossible, as the benefits the Poles desire (increased food distributions and goods) cannot be granted. For Polish civilian workers in the old Reich, loosening measures are only possible to a limited extent due to security and political concerns. The Reichsführer-SS has already ordered a change to the Polish designation, and IV B has made a corresponding proposal. Additionally, the introduction of the performance-based principle for Poles, which has proven effective in the Warthegau, will be proposed.
The present moment is seen by various sides as suitable for a reorganization of Polish policy.
The surrender of Warsaw has caused a remarkable emotional stir in the GG’s population, a state that likely will not last long. Although Polish trust in the Allies has decreased significantly, and distrust of Bolshevism has increased sharply, it is certain that the general conviction among the Polish people is that Germany has lost the war. It is unlikely that many Poles would be found willing to genuinely support the German cause based solely on the recent events in Warsaw. Any measures that rely on current Polish political sentiments for success will not find a reliable basis and will end in setbacks. This is always evident in Polish comments (see annex). Poles always point out that loyal cooperation with the Germans, even from the AK’s side, is currently possible, as long as the Allies are not informed.
Thus, the view from here remains that any significant shift in Polish policy would be purposeless and even dangerous until Germany can once again demonstrate its undiminished military strength to the world, as otherwise, German political options would be prematurely exhausted or forfeited.