This directive on “Burial sites of the Jews”, issued on 25 April 1942 by the District Commissioner of Wilna-Land (Vilnius Region), instructed local authorities that “the liquidation sites of the Jews must immediately be covered with sufficient quantities of chlorinated lime and the sites must be filled in with new earth”.
A report dated 22 November 1943 from the Security Police and SD field office in Ponevezh (Panevėžys) to the Security Police and SD in Kaunas adressed the escape of a “Jewish labor detachment at the District Commissioner in Ponevezh”. It states that “27 Jews, including one policeman, were apprehended” and “that they had fled because the District Commissioner had told them that all would be shot if even one person escaped.”
The report further notes that the recaptured Jewish prisoner Kurisa Levinas “was given special treatment on the orders of Hauptsturmführer Schmitz, as he had been shot while fleeing and was seriously wounded. His death was to be expected in any case.”
The report requests a decision as to whether the remaining Jewish prisoners should also undergo “special treatment”. In the case of the “Jewish policeman Bakas”, the Ponevezh office recommends that “special treatment be considered” because “he failed to report the events, although he was aware of them”.
This document, dated 31 August 1941 and issued by the Trakai district administration in Lithuania, reports that “in Kaišiadorys, Žasliai, and Žiežmariai there is not a single person of Jewish nationality remaining,” and proceeds to request instructions on how “to deal with the movable and immovable property that belonged to the Jews.”
A series of wartime letters from early 1944 shows how knowledge of Sonderkommando 1005 circulated within German military and SS circles. In this correspondence, Oberleutnant Willy Schell threatens SS-Obersturmführer Radif – who was at the time in custody in connection with the escape of Jewish prisoners from the Sonderkommando 1005 site at Fort IX in Kaunas- “to report to your superiors the careless manner in which you told me about your Kommando 1005 B, even giving me concrete figures.” Schell sought to pressure Radif into retracting his testimony that Schell had disclosed an unspecified incident involving homosexual conduct. In his reply, the Commander of the Security Police in Kaunas stated that “I will in any case hold SS-Obersturmführer Radif accountable in this matter, although I would note that the confidential matter you refer to has long been generally known and has even been described in detail in illegal Lithuanian propaganda leaflets”. The defensive tone of the response – the Security Police refrained from reporting Schell to the legal authorities as this “could have unforeseeable consequences” – underscores the sensitivity of the information. So what makes these documents particularly interesting is the tension they reveal: on the one hand, Sonderkommando 1005 was an operation surrounded by extreme secrecy; on the other, fragments of its purpose – exhumation and destruction of bodies – were clearly leaking beyond strictly controlled channels.
A report dated November 7, 1943, written by a employee attached to the Commander of the Security Police in Kaunas states that the local criminal police had determined that “nighttime fires at Fort IX”were caused by the burning of “Jewish bones”. This activity correspomds with the operations of Sonderkommando 1005 at Kaunas, a program led by Paul Blobel, which was tasked with exhuming mass graves and destroying evidence of Nazi atrocities across Eastern Europe.
On May 16, 1942, SS-Untersturmführer August Becker submitted a report to the head of RSHA department II D, Walther Rauff, on his inspection of the operation of the homicidal gas vans at the Einsatzgruppen. Becker noted that the vehicles had become widely recognized, “that not only the authorities but also the civilian population referred to them as ‘death vehicles’ as soon as one of them appeared”. He also observed “various units have their own men unload the vehicle after the gassing,” and warned the commanders of “what enormous psychological and physical harm this work can cause to the men.” He states that “the gassing is generally not carried out correctly,” as drivers “consistently apply full throttle,” with the result that victims “die of suffocation.”
In March 1943, the Swiss Legation in Germany forwarded a transcript of a report from Alfred Rosenberg’s Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories dated May 13, 1942, on the public sentiment in German-occupied Ukraine during the Second World War. Among other observations, the report noted that “the exemplary conduct of the German soldiers dispelled the initial concerns about the alleged brutality of our troops. If we disregard the executions of Jews, which have not improved our reputation—however much Jewry is hated there—the hardships necessary in war have not greatly impressed the Russian people, for they are accustomed to such things”.
Telex from the Higher SS and Police Leader (HSSPF) Russia South, Friedrich Jeckeln, to the Kommando Stab RF-SS, dated 26 August 1941. The situation report records that the 1st SS Brigade reported “82 Jews shot,” Police Regiment South reported “549 Jews shot,” Police Battalion 314 recorded “69 Jews shot,” and the staff company of the HSSPF reported “546 Jews shot.” Taken together, the figures in the telex amount to the reported shooting of 1,269 Jews.
A confidential report dated April 7, 1942, issued by the Lublin Labor Office, documents labor allocations for March 1942, including transfers of workers to the Reich, SS construction projects, and the reorganization of Jewish forced labor during the early phase of Operation Reinhard. The report explicitly records the onset of mass deportations in Lublin that “in mid-month a larger resettlement action of Jews was initiated by the SS and Police Leader, which is still ongoing and during which the ghetto was sealed off. Of the 40,000 Jews residing in Lublin, all but approximately 2,000 are being removed from the city. These 2,000 consist of approximately 800 skilled workers and their family members.” The document further states that “The resettlement action is also to be carried out in the towns of the rest of the district”.
Radio message from the Higher SS and Police Leader (HSSPF) Russia South, Friedrich Jeckeln, to the Kommando Stab RF-SS, dated 28 August 1941. The situation report records that Police Regiment South reported “369 Jews shot,” while Police Battalion 320 stated that, “approximately 5,000 Jews were shot” during the “special action” in Kamenets-Podolsky (Kamianets-Podilskyi).